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INTRODUCTION   
Regulations enforced since 1990 have made bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) a 
reportable disease in both Canada and the United States.  Since then, five cases have been 
discovered in North America.  All five cases involved cattle that had been on farms in Alberta.   
 
On December 8, 1993 BSE was found in a purebred beef cow that had been imported 
from the United Kingdom in 1987. That animal and its herd mates were destroyed along with all 
offspring and all remaining animals imported from the United Kingdom since 1982.
3  While 
cattle imports to Canada from the United Kingdom had been banned since 1990, the Canadian 
government implemented more stringent disease detection and control measures on farms and at 
slaughter plants.  Then in 1997, in response to the high profile BSE crisis in the United 
Kingdom, the Canadian and U.S. governments introduced ruminant-to-ruminant feed bans.  The 
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central governments of each country continued their policy of prohibiting imports of ruminants 
and ruminant products from countries with a reported case of BSE.  Cattle and beef exports from 
Canada were not affected.   
 
On May 20, 2003, BSE was confirmed in an Angus cow in Wanham, Alberta. Unlike the 
earlier case, the infected animal was born, fed and raised in Canada.  The consequences of this 
discovery were devastating for cattle producers and other industry stakeholders in Canada as the 
potential risks to human and animal health from BSE had become a major economic and political 
issue.  Governments of 34 countries, including the United States and Mexico, banned imports of 
ruminant and ruminant products originating from Canada using the same criteria established by 
Office International des Épizooties the Canadian government had used to justify its import 
prohibitions.  The resulting dislocation in the cattle industry in Canada was unprecedented, and 
could have been much worse if the USDA had not readmitted imports of boxed beef muscle cuts 
and veal from Canada in September 2003. 
 
The third case of BSE in North America was found in a Holstein cow in Yakima, 
Washington on December 25, 2003.  The discovery unleashed additional, significant economic 
havoc on the North American cattle market.  Within hours of the United States Department of 
Agriculture confirmation of this discovery, governments of more than 50 nations, including 
Canada, Mexico, Japan, South Korea, Chile, Mexico and Taiwan, banned American beef 
imports.  Like in Canada, border closures led to a collapse of the beef export business, a 
reduction of trade between backgrounders and feedlots, a decrease in the market value of 
slaughtered animals, and devastated export-oriented meat processing plants.  However, since the 
cattle industry in the United States was not as export dependent as was the Canadian industry, 
the impact on cattlemen in the United States from the border closures was relatively less acute. 
 
Initially it appeared the BSE status of Canada and the United States would be identical. 
Later it was determined the cow in Washington was actually born in Alberta. The situation for 
the Canadian beef industry got even worse because opponents of cattle and beef trade used the 
cow's Canadian connection as a tool to slow and frustrate the normalization of live cattle trade 
across the Canada-United States border. LeRoy, Weerahewa and Anderson  3 
 
 
Cattle producers in Canada showed tremendous resourcefulness and resilience as they 
worked to get past this difficult situation.  Finally on December 29, 2004 the USDA announced 
that it would re-open its borders to live cattle under 30 months of age as of March 7, 2005.  The 
ensuing enthusiasm in Canada did not last long.  On January 2, 2005 a fourth case of BSE was 
confirmed in an eight year old Holstein cow from a farm in Barrhead, Alberta.  Then on January 
11, 2005, a fifth case was confirmed in a seven year old Charolais cow from Innisfail, Alberta. 
 
While material from the two most recent cases did not enter the food or feed systems, 
they raised concerns in the United States about lifting the import ban on Canadian cattle.  On 
March 2, 2005, a federal judge in Billings, Montana, granted an immediate preliminary 
injunction against USDA regulations that would have allowed imports of Canadian slaughter and 
feeder cattle less than 30 months of age.  The next day, the United States Senate voted 52-46 in 
favour of keeping the border closed to Canadian cattle.  While an appeal of the Montana judge’s 
decision is to be heard in the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco in June, a hearing on 
a permanent injunction is scheduled for July 27 in Billings. 
 
Before May 20, 2003 the cattle sector was a shining example of harmonization and 
market integration under NAFTA.  It is now a stunning and troubling exemplification of 
disharmony, market segregation and confusion.  Losing access to the live cattle market in the 
United States has motivated Canadian decision markers in both the public and private sector to 
focus almost entirely on the domestic market for solutions.  The loss of foreign live cattle 
markets has not been as devastating for cattlemen in the United States.  With no import 
competition from cattle producers in Canada and sustained final consumer demand for beef, 
cattle producers in the United States and exporters from Mexico have enjoyed some of the 
highest prices in recent history. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to assess the economic relationship between the NAFTA and 
the current disruption and adjustments occurring in the cattle and hog industries.  The NAFTA 
had only a minor effect on cattle trade within North America (with the exception of the 
elimination of tariffs on cattle imports into Mexico) when it was implemented in 1994.  In view LeRoy, Weerahewa and Anderson  4 
 
of the current crisis in the cattle industry, the Agreement also appears to have little effect on 
limiting the ability of a central authority to impose trade restrictions for the alleged purpose of 
protecting human, animal and environmental health.   
 
The paper is organized into six sections.  The next section describes how government 
intervention in the cattle industry led to the expansion and integration of the cattle industry in 
North America, but also to its vulnerable structure and plunge into chaos.  The third section 
identifies the various taxpayer financed producer assistance programs that governments in 
Canada implemented in response to the BSE crisis and assesses the economic effects of these 
programs.  Section four briefly describes the effect of BSE on the North American hog market.  
The fifth section discusses the results of an empirical model used to quantify the effects of the 




  Most beef cattle in North America are located in the United States.  At present there are 
95 million head in the United States, 27 to 30 million in Mexico (estimates vary by source), and 
15 million in Canada. 
 
  Cattle feeding activities in Canada and the United States often occur in large scale, high 
density feedlots.  Cattle are fed using domestic supplies of feed grains and forages.  Methods of 
production are different in Mexico. While beef cattle breeds in Northern Mexico are the same as 
those in the Canada and the United States, dual purpose breeds dominate in Southern Mexico.  
Cattle feeding activities in Mexico have not developed along the same lines as in the other 
NAFTA regions because of a comparative disadvantage in feed production and because of 
differences in domestic agricultural policies.   
 
  This section briefly describes the evolution of the cattle trade across the Canada-United 
States border, how central governments encouraged the integration of the cattle industry within 
the NAFTA region, and the outcome of this policy objective. 
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Cross Border Trade in Cattle 
 
Through much of its development, trade was not the lifeblood of the cattle industry in 
Canada or the United States.  During the 20th century cross border trade often was hampered by 
tariffs, prohibitions, and transportation subsidies on commodities shipped east.  Domestic 
markets were the industry’s mainstay in both countries.  This was an especially contentious issue 
with western Canadian cattlemen.  They saw their natural market a few miles south rather than 
satisfying far away customers in Eastern Canada and in the United Kingdom.   
 
Access to the American market has been and is considered “business as usual” by 
Canadian cattlemen.  However, the opportunity to satisfy this market has been unreliable.  Open 
borders contributed to expansion in the Canadian cattle industry and dependence on the U.S. 
market, while blocked access has led to difficult and painful contractions.  The boom-bust cycle 
created by government interference in live cattle markets occurred three times in the last century, 
with varying consequences. 
 
Cross border trade first expanded rapidly after Woodrow Wilson repealed a live cattle 
tariff in 1913.  Exports to the United States increased from fewer than 10,000 head in 1912 to 
more than 450,000 in 1919.  In response to high war time prices, the herd in Canada grew from 6 
million head in 1913 to more than 10 million head in 1919.  In the early 1920s, the United States 
government re-imposed tariffs and by 1930 had increased them to 30%.  Cattlemen in Canada 
were effectively shut out of the United States market.  Packing plants closed, prices spiraled 
down and cattle feeding activities contracted. 
 
During the early years of the Second World War, demand for live cattle increased, prices 
escalated, and the Canadian herd more than doubled to 11 million.  There also was a partial 
opening of the United States border.  Satisfying the American market again became the objective 
of cattlemen in Canada.  In 1941 however, fears of domestic shortages led the Canadian 
government to shut off this export market and subsidize cattle feeding activities through 
producer price guarantees and an Eastern feed freight assistance program.  After years of LeRoy, Weerahewa and Anderson  6 
 
lobbying the federal government, cattlemen in Western Canada regained access to the United 
States market in 1948.  Despite the change, most live cattle shipped from the region to be 
fattened and then slaughtered continued to go east rather than south because of grain 
transportation subsidies. 
 
The inescapable problems created by government intervention in the grains sector and 
policies to remedy them provided the catalyst for expanding livestock production in Western 
Canada during the 1980s.  The Alberta government developed major new programs to stimulate 
large scale expansion of cattle production and processing activities.  The Alberta government 
(along with the Canadian and other provincial governments) was keenly interested in obtaining 
better and more secure market access for products that were being actively promoted and 
subsidized.  The pursuit of these narrow domestic mercantilist objectives coincided with the 
negotiation of a broader bilateral mercantilist agreement.  The Canada – United States Trade 
Agreement (and later NAFTA) granted preferential trade status to goods produced within the 
signing countries while penalizing goods from outside, including beef.  The integration of the 
North American cattle industry was encouraged from behind a wall of protection from the world 




Quantitative import restrictions into the United States under the Meat Import Act of 1979 
created a significant trade impediment for beef exporters in Canada.  Following the 
implementation of the CUSTA, beef produced in Canada became exempt from import quotas in 
the United States and beef exporters in the United States gained unhampered access to the 
Canadian market.  Tariffs on live cattle were eliminated.  However, import barriers were 
maintained and enforced by governments in Canada and the United States for beef producers 
outside the CUSTA region.  The Canadian International Trade Tribunal, for example, limited 
imports of subsidized beef from the European Union and less expensive, unsubsidized beef from 
Latin America and Oceania.  Every five years, the appeal for protection was successfully LeRoy, Weerahewa and Anderson  7 
 
renewed.  In 1994, this preferential trade system was extended to the government of Mexico 
under the NAFTA.
4   
 
An outcome of the Uruguay Round Agreement was to convert nontariff trade barriers, 
like those used to limit beef imports into the NAFTA region, to bound tariffs.  This was done to 
improve the transparency of existing agricultural trade barriers and to facilitate their future 
reduction.  The current tariff rate quota in Canada for offshore beef is 76,000 tonnes.  Imports 
above that quantity face a 26.5% tariff or require a supplementary import permit.  A 
supplementary import permit allows a processor or wholesaler tariff free access to specific beef 
products which cannot be sourced from suppliers within the NAFTA region.  Non-NAFTA beef 
imports into the United States above 696,621 tonnes incur a 26.4% tariff.  In Mexico, the over-
quota tariff for non-NAFTA beef is 25%. 
 
The economic consequences of a tariff policy are well known.  The protection shifts 
production from the most advantageous natural conditions to regions less well suited. It 
diminishes the productivity of capital and labor and it increases production costs.  The tariff 
benefits cattle and beef producers in the NAFTA region at the expense of the producers of other 
goods and services and at the expense of all consumers. Shielded from the full competitive 
pressure of producers outside the NAFTA region, cattle and beef producers in North America 
focused on satisfying consumers within their trading bloc and in high price regions like Japan 




In addition to limiting beef imports into the NAFTA region, protectionist prescriptions 
were designed and applied to further help the cattle producers in Canada.  During the 1980s 
governments in Canada provided taxpayer transfers to reduce the costs of local feed grains 
(offsetting other subsidies – like those provided under the Western Grains Transportation Act – 
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which hampered cattle feeding activities in Western Canada), to increase processing capacity and 
to develop offshore markets for Canadian cattle and beef.
5 
 
Long frustrated by the effect of subsidized freight rates for prairie grains that increased 
the on-farm prices of grain, the Alberta government instituted a subsidy to offset the detrimental 
impacts of the subsidy on the grain freight rates.  Beginning September 1, 1985, the Alberta 
Feedgrain Market Adjustment Program offered subsidies of C$21/tonne for grain used for 
livestock feeding.  On July 1, 1987, the program was changed and became known as the Alberta 
Crow Benefit Offset Program.  The level of subsidy was reduced – first to C$13/t for the 1987-
88 and 1988-89 crop years, and then to C$11/t for the 1989-90 crop year.  The Alberta 
government reported spending nearly C$49 million on this program in 1989-90 (Alberta 
Agriculture 1989-90).  
 
The Alberta subsidy made cattle production more profitable in Alberta than in the other 
Prairie Provinces.  In response, both the Saskatchewan and Manitoba governments announced 
that they too would offer a Crow Offset program to livestock producers in their provinces.   
Beginning September 1, 1989, Saskatchewan producers received C$13/t for each tonne of feed 
grain used to feed cattle and hogs in a feedlot.  Manitoba restricted its program to slaughter cattle 
only and paid C$9/t for feed used (Klein et al 1991).    
 
A second major initiative entailed the expansion of cattle slaughter capacity in Alberta.  
Following Canada's exemption from the Meat Import Act in the United States, multi-national 
beef slaughtering enterprises made large investments in Alberta.  In May 1989, Cargill opened a 
C$55 million state-of-the-art facility in High River.  The cost of erecting this plant was 
subsidized by a C$4 million grant from Alberta’s Processing and Marketing Agreement, a 
regional development program designed to encourage secondary manufacturing firms and add 
value to create agricultural products (Byfield and Johnson, 1987).   
 
When plans for the new plant became public, Alberta’s existing meat packers denounced 
the taxpayer transfer required to build it.  They observed that Alberta’s cattle kill was only 
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21,000 cattle per week, yet the province’s existing plants had slaughter capacity sufficient to 
handle 30,000 per week.  Competitors feared the subsidy would enable the new plant to operate 
at a loss long enough to drive all the existing competitors out of the market (Byfield and 
Johnson, 1987).   The counter argument from the provincial government and Alberta feedlot 
operators was that some 200,000 finished cattle were being exported from Alberta each week at 
that time, and a new kill plant would add value to more cattle in Alberta.  In addition, the 
creation of a big new market for cattle and low prices for grain would provide an incentive to 
increase the production of finished slaughter cattle in southern Alberta feedlots. 
 
To help diversify export destinations for beef, a third major initiative involved 
developing a beef export promotion agency.  The market development division of Alberta 
Agriculture worked closely with Alberta meat processors, packers, exporters and the Alberta 
Cattle Commission (representing the producers) to develop an industry organization to address 
the market opportunities presented by the liberalization of the Japanese beef market (Alberta 
Agriculture, 1988-89).  The Canadian Beef Export Federation (CBEF) opened its first trade 
office in the Canadian Embassy in Tokyo in November 1989.  The Alberta Government financed 
80% of the CBEF’s C$800,000 initial budget (Edmonton Journal, 1989) .  The selection of 
Tokyo for its first office was a direct result of the liberalization of the Japanese beef market 
through the Beef Market Access Agreement between Japan, the United States and Australia.  The 
Alberta government and the Alberta Cattleman’s Association forecasted a possible market for 
Canadian beef of C$300 million per year (Edmonton Journal, 1989) (a little optimistic since 
sales in this market peaked at C$171 million in 2001 and declined to only C$96 million in 2002 
– ahead of the BSE problem in Canada).   
 
Cattle production throughout Canada also was supported during this period through the 
National Tripartite Stabilization Program.   This program encouraged production by guaranteeing 
prices and production margins at 90% of a 10 year moving average.  In 1988, C$7.7 million of 
producer premiums triggered payouts to slaughter cattle producers in Alberta of over C$62 
million.  In 1989, the average payout to Alberta producers of slaughter cattle was over C$35,000 
(Alberta Agriculture, 1988-90).  This program was terminated in 1995. 
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Changes in the Cattle Market in the United States 
  
  Live cattle imports to the United States from Canada and Mexico increased from about 
600,000 in 1980 to 2.5 million in 2002.  The growth in live cattle imports was due to several 
factors. The decline in beef demand, increase in production per cow, the cattle cycle, and the 
related issues of production costs combined to create an advantage in feeding and slaughtering 
cattle and relatively less advantage in producing calves.  These underlying economic conditions 
led to increased imports of feeder and fed cattle from Canada and feeder cattle from Mexico and 
increased beef exports. 
 
  These changes in the cattle market in the United States were not to the liking of some 
industry stakeholders.  Groups unhappy over increased cattle imports from Canada had been 
active for many years and had grown in strength before 2003.  Finding the May 2003 BSE 
positive cow caused the border closure and gave these groups the ability to act to keep it closed.  




Policies in the 1980s and early 1990s were directed at increasing cattle production and 
processing activities within the NAFTA region.  Prima facie evidence suggests that these 
objectives were realized.   
 
In Canada, beef exports increased by almost 500% between 1989 and 2001.
6  Over the 
same time period, cattle inventory in Canada increased from 11 million head to almost 14 
million.
7  The beef industry became an important part of the agri-food economy and the second 
largest (after wheat) earner of foreign exchange in the agricultural sector.  In 2002, farm cash 
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receipts from cattle and calves totaled nearly C$8 billion, 21% of the total C$36 billion in farm 
cash receipts (Statistics Canada).   
 
In the United States, beef exports doubled from 1 billion lbs in 1989 to 2.3 billion lbs in 
2001 (USDA, Red Meat Yearbook).  Over the same period beef imports increased from 2.3 
billion lbs to 3.2 billion lbs (USDA, Red Meat Yearbook).  While cross border beef trade had 
increased, the United States remained a major importer of beef.  In contrast, the response to 
expansionary policies in Canada meant that exports became very important.  Net exports of 
cattle, which had been small and occasionally negative before 1987, grew to about 1.5 million 
head by 2002.  Net exports of dressed beef, again of a minor magnitude until 1995, grew to about 
350,000 tonnes by 2002.  By 2002, beef export earnings of about C$4 billion from exports 
against only C$1 billion in beef imports (Canfax, 2003).   
 
As a large and growing portion of beef production in Canada was exported, producers 
became increasingly dependent on access to foreign markets.  Though beef can be frozen and 
stored for some time before serious deterioration in quality takes place, producers can ill afford 
lengthy embargoes on exports.  Worse, with increased integration of the North American beef 
market, slaughter capacity in Canada became inadequate to handle all the animals produced in 
that country.  This was particularly critical for older breeding stock which are regularly culled as 
new replacements enter the herd.  A large proportion of culls had been exported from Canada 
and slaughtered at plants located in the United States.  They had no place to go when the 
American border was closed to live cattle imports and the major slaughter plants in Canada 
became overwhelmed with deliveries of more profitable high grade, younger animals. 
 
A long history of producing mostly for the domestic market led to institutions and “ways 
of thinking” that left producers ill prepared for major exposure to the severe demands of the 
international market place.  This was not so much a problem as long as producers responded to 
market signals related (mostly) to the demands of domestic consumers.  However, meddling in 
the industry by governments that began in the mid-1980s led producers to a situation where they 
became extremely vulnerable to any closure of export markets.   
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Efforts by governments to negotiate international trade accords that would prevent 
indiscriminate border closures ultimately proved fruitless in the face of the BSE discovery in 
Canada.
8 In fact, the way in which the cattle market in North America was integrated has come 
back to haunt primary producers and policy makers.  Consequences to primary producers were 
negligible when the central governments in the NAFTA region prohibited consumers from 
accessing meat produced in non-NAFTA countries when there was an incident of BSE in these 
regions.  When BSE appeared in South America and Europe the central governments prohibited 
cattle and beef imports without fear of reprisal.  The central governments had the legal authority 
to do this under Sanitarty and Phyto-sanitary Agreement in the Uruguay Round.  However, when 
BSE was discovered in Canada, the weakness of the protectionist policies were laid bare while 
cattle producers in Canada (and packers in the Pacific Northwest states) had once again become 
dependent upon unimpeded access to the United States market.   
 
GOVERNMENT AND PRODUCER RESPONSES IN CANADA 
 
The response to the May 2003 discovery of BSE in a single cow was swift, decisive and 
aggressive.  Cattle prices at one Alberta auction dropped from C$1.20 a pound to 32 cents before 
most cattle were taken home again.  Slaughter plants in Canada stopped accepting new cattle.  
The Canadian government stopped all beef shipments not already in transit.  Some live animals 
already in the United States were returned to Canada.  Packing plants in Canada reduced 
slaughtering activities and laid off employees.  Truckers who specialize in hauling live cattle saw 
the demand for their service evaporate as did the suppliers of inputs to feedlots and cattle 




Figure 1 provides a timeline of milestone events of BSE crisis in North America.  It 
identifies the various disaster assistance programs that were developed in full consultation with 
industry representatives and implemented by governments in Canada.  In addition to the 
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programs developed jointly with the Federal and Provincial governments, each provincial 
government implemented their own assistance programs. Because most live cattle are located in 
Alberta, the description of the programs which follows focuses on programs designed and 
delivered in that province. 
 
In Canada, government assistance programs were aimed at short term solutions as policy 
makers and industry representatives believed the live cattle import ban in the United States 
would be lifted within weeks.  In retrospect, this was an optimistic assumption given that seven 
years is the usual period before a government re-opens its border after an exporting region 
reports a case of BSE.
9   
 
Compounding the uncertainty about how to assist cattle producers, existing government 
assistance programs in Canada were undergoing a major change.  The Federal-Provincial disaster 
based safety net compensation program, called the Farm Income Disaster Program, expired on 
March 31, 2003.  In the spring of 2003, policy makers were negotiating its replacement, the 
Agricultural Policy Framework.  By May 20, 2003, Federal and Provincial governments had 
committed to the Agricultural Policy Framework, but they had not worked out the details of the 
farm safety net program.  Given the expectations of a near term border opening and without the 
specifics of a farm safety net program in place, assistance programs have been implemented 
quickly and repeatedly. 
 
  Short Term Relief Grants Within weeks of the May 20, 2003 case, packing plant 
workers in Alberta who had been laid off qualified for short-term training and a relief grant while 
they are in the two-week waiting period for Employment Insurance benefits.  They were offered 
to two weeks of workplace safety or other job-related training, and received a relief grant of up 
to C$330 a week for participating, without affecting their employment insurance benefits.  The 
provincial government estimated the cost of this program to be C$1 million. 
 
Federal-Provincial BSE Recovery Program On June 18, 2003 the federal government 
announced a major assistance scheme for the beef industry to offset BSE-devastated prices. The 
                                                 
9 Once beef shipments resumed, many in Canada believed that trade in live cattle would recommence also. LeRoy, Weerahewa and Anderson  14 
 
federal government initially committed C$190 million, to which it expected provincial 
governments to add another C$126 million. The objective of the Federal-Provincial BSE 
Recovery Program was to make up the difference between actual prices and a trigger price set by 
Ottawa.  Payments were made on a maximum of 900,000 head of cattle or until exports resumed 
to the United States, which ever came first.  The scheme also set aside C$30 million to offset 
declines in prices of meat in storage as of May 20.  The program ran until August 31, 2003. 
 
The Federal-Provincial BSE Recovery Program was intended to stabilize the market and 
get urgent help to producers facing a sharp reduction in demand and prices after the ban on 
exports to the United States.  Despite its laudable objective, aid programs gave producers the 
incentive to sell cattle as slaughter was required to trigger payments and domestic cattle prices 
plummeted further.  As large owners of cattle themselves, packers in Alberta received C$45-
million of the total assistance, which was doled out not on the basis of financial need but 
according to the number of cattle owned.  At the same time, retailers were selling the beef at 
close to normal prices thanks to stable consumer demand and a lack of processing capacity. 
 
On July 25, 2003 cattle producers in Alberta were eligible to receive C$79 million more 
in taxpayer transfers.  This funding was in addition to the federal-provincial compensation 
program announced in June, and later expanded August 7 to include additional livestock 
industries, such as bison, elk, deer and sheep.  Specifics of the program included a C$65 million 
Fed Cattle Competitive Bid Program and C$4 million Stranded Beef Export Container Initiative, 
and a loan guarantee program. 
 
Alberta Fed Cattle Competitive Bid Program This program was designed to eliminate 
some of the backlog on Alberta feedlots by allowing buyers to purchase fed cattle, which they 
were required to hold for a minimum of eight weeks. Initial sellers were eligible for payments on 
the same basis as cattle sold for slaughter under the federal-provincial compensation plan. These 
cattle were not eligible for any further program payments.   
 
Stranded Export Beef Container Initiative The Stranded Export Beef Container 
Initiative paid for the storage and demurrage costs of Canadian beef that has been turned away or LeRoy, Weerahewa and Anderson  15 
 
held in warehouses in foreign markets. It was hoped this program would maintain long-term 
trade relationships with foreign buyers and allow for easier re-entry into those markets when the 
borders re-opened. 
 
Loan Guarantees To address cash flow issues facing Alberta producers, terms and 
conditions were adjusted under the Alberta Farm Development Loan Guarantee Program and the 
Alberta Disaster Assistance Loan Program. Loan limits were increased to C$1 million for all 
primary producers.  The taxpayer transfer of this program was estimated at C$10 million per 
year. 
 
Alberta Fed Cattle Competitive Market Adjustment Program On August 25, the Alberta 
Fed Cattle Competitive Market Adjustment Program was implemented for the purpose of 
increasing live cattle sales and prices in until the United States border opened.  Unlike the 
Alberta Fed Cattle Competitive Bid Program announced on June 25, purchasers were not 
required to delay slaughter or transportation of the eligible animals.  All cattle were required to 
enter the “competitive” marketplace and were then branded with an “X” to avoid double-dipping. 
This program initially was intended to continue until the United States border opened to live 
cattle, but was terminated on September 13. 
 
Alberta BSE Slaughter Market Adjustment Program Until September 23, 2003 
producers of other ruminants like bison, veal, sheep, goat, elk and deer producers had not 
received any compensation.  A program similar to the Federal-Provincial BSE Recovery 
program was implemented for producers of these species. The Alberta BSE Slaughter Market 
Adjustment Program for Other Ruminants was forecast to cost the taxpayer C$3 million. 
Producers who sold animals for slaughter were eligible for compensation on a sliding scale equal 
to the difference between a base price and an average weekly market price. 
 
Alberta Steer and Heifer Market Transition Program The fourth program available only 
to cattlemen in Alberta was the Alberta Steer and Heifer Market Transition Program.  Its purpose 
was to provide additional support for animals on feed at May 20, 2003 and still on feed as at LeRoy, Weerahewa and Anderson  16 
 
September 12, 2003.  The projected taxpayer transfer associated with this program was C$55 
million. 
 
Beef Product and Market Development Program The Beef Product and Market 
Development Program was announced on October 24, 2003.  The purpose of this program was to 
find new uses for beef in processed foods, especially beef from cattle over 30 months old.  The 
original budget for this program was C$4 million.  As food processors submitted applications 
and project proposals, forecasted transfers doubled to C$8 million.  
 
Food Processor Assistance Initiative The objective of this program was to provide 
financial assistance to companies who normally export products into markets that were closed 
due to BSE.  Payments were designed to help companies resume business in export markets once 
they are opened, or, to divert products to the domestic market.  Announced on October 24, 2003, 
taxpayer transfers associated with this program were expected to total C$400,000. 
 
Alberta Mature Market Animal Transition Program This program was one of two 
targeted at resolving the problem of increasing inventories of cull animals.  A federal program 
required that producers slaughter cull animals to receive transfers.  Officials at Alberta 
Agriculture and Rural Development believed this strategy was flawed as the market for the 
resulting beef would not maximize returns to producers. Instead, the Mature Market Animal 
Transition Program offered producers in Alberta two alternatives to resolve the cull animal 
problem.  Producers could choose to receive a payment on a per head basis or they could market 
eligible cull animals and receive a deficiency payment.  The objectives of the provincial program 
were to: [1] redevelop market price discovery for culls and other mature ruminants after a partial 
border opening, [2] to provide an incentive to minimize on farm killing and disposal, and [3] to 
support transition to a restructured, domestic focused cull animal market.  The budget transfer 
with this program was C$60 million. 
 
Winter Feed Program Taxpayer transfers under this program announced on November 
24, 2003 were directed to producers of deer, elk, llamas and alpacas on a per head basis.  The LeRoy, Weerahewa and Anderson  17 
 
purpose of the program was to provide taxpayer transfer of C$4 million to help overcome 
marketing difficulties. 
 
Table 1 shows that between June 25, 2003 and June 4, 2004 the BSE compensation 
programs for livestock enterprises in Alberta covered 972,721 animals and transfers were made 
to 22,312 enterprises on a per animal basis.  The total sum transferred to livestock producers was 
C$402,882,627.28 (Alberta Agriculture 2004) and was the subject of a major audit (Alberta 
Attorney General 2004).  
 
Outside of Alberta, the federal and other provincial governments transferred hundreds of 
millions of dollars to help cattle producers deal with the fallout of BSE.  The federal and 
provincial governments provided C$520 million through the BSE Recovery Program.  The 
federal government provided an additional C$120 million to help producers deal with a growing 
surplus of older cull animals and it announced a C$488 million strategy to reposition the 
livestock industry on September 10, 2004.   
 
Federal-Provincial Livestock Industry Repositioning Initiative  This joint federal-
provincial initiative was aimed at continuing efforts to reopen the United States border, taking 
steps to increasing ruminant slaughter in Canada (C$66 million), introducing measures to sustain 
the cattle industry until capacity comes online (C$385 million) and expanding access to export 
markets for both livestock and beef products ($37 million).  The Alberta government’s 40-per-
cent share of two new national cattle programs in that province and funds to help cover BSE 
surveillance costs was estimated at C$230 million. 
 
In Alberta the initiative was announced as a six point plan:  [1] establishing a loan loss 
reserve to increase lenders' willingness to support projects to increase ruminant slaughter 
capacity, [2] to find new uses for beef in processed foods, especially beef from cattle over 30 
months old, [3] implementing set-aside programs for fed and feeder cattle in which producers 
were eligible for transfers on a per head basis if they held back market ready livestock, [4] BSE 
surveillance subsidies for producers of $150 per eligible sample (abattoirs received $75 per head 
to compensate for their additional costs), [5] research initiatives and [6] funding for the new LeRoy, Weerahewa and Anderson  18 
 
income safety net program (Canadian Agricultural Income Stabilization Program) that provides 
transfers to producers who have experienced a loss of income as a result of BSE or other factors.   
 
Additional Recent Programs On March 7, 2005 an additional C$37 million transfer was 
announced for BSE recovery initiatives in Alberta.  C$30 million was directed toward a Beef 
Market Development and Retention Fund to help find more export markets and increase sales in 
existing ones. The remaining C$7 million will be used to create commercial uses for discarded 
specified risk materials. 
 
On April 7, 2005, C$2.1 million was made available to assist sheep, goat, deer, elk, 
reindeer, and bison producers.  A total of $1.1 million is to be distributed through the Diversified 
Livestock Fund of Alberta, to subsidize marketing activities in domestic and international 
markets. The other $1 million will be a grant used by elk producers to expand local and 




Officials from Canada, Mexico and the United States met on March 29, 2005 in Mexico 
City to harmonize import standard within North America for BSE. The harmonized North 
American standard is designed to protect of human and animal health and food safety, while also 
establishing a framework for safe international trade opportunities for cattle and beef products 
from Canada, Mexico and the United States. Implementation is subject to the completion of the 
respective regulatory processes in each of the three countries.  
 
The government of Mexico has indicated that they will amend their import permits to 
allow for the importation of a broader range of commodities from Canada. These measures will 
be consistent with those that were proposed to be implemented in the United States on March 7, 
2005. The U.S. has agreed to consider such action as consistent with its requirements for 
continued access by Mexico to its market.  
 
Chapter 11 NAFTA Challenge LeRoy, Weerahewa and Anderson  19 
 
 
  On August 12, 2004, a group of about 100 cattlemen from Canada notified the United 
States government about their intention to launch NAFTA claim.  Under the Chapter 11 
investment challenge, Canadian producers must prove the American action is harming a 
Canadian's investment in the United States.  At issue is whether United States government is 
providing better treatment to its own investors than to Canadians because it allows producers in 
the United States to keep Canadian-origin cattle while stopping other animals of the same age at 
the border.  In addition, the United States government is allowing complete access to all 
rendering plants for its investors, while forbidding access to the same plants for Canadian 
investors.  More claims will follow, to be consolidated into a single case for hearing in 2005 
before an impartial and independent tribunal made up of three international arbitrators.   
 
THE EFFECT ON THE HOG MARKET 
 
Along with the cattle industry, hog industries in Canada, the United States and Mexico 
have become more integrated.  As the hog industry in the United States consolidated and 
vertically integrated over the last 15 years, market ties with buyers and sellers in Canada became 
more important.  Management and production technology like separate farrowing and feeding 
production, all in-all out production, and contract production created the opportunity to exploit 
economic advantages.  Weaner pigs can be trucked long distances.  Fewer diseases in Canada 
allowed the growth of farrowing and weaning operations in Canada to truck small feeder pigs to 
the United States to exploit feed advantages.  These changes have led to increased live hog 
exports to the United States, much to the concern of many American producers.   
 
The prohibition of live cattle trade in 2003 had complex effect on the hog market.  Beef 
prices increased throughout the supply chain in the United States because of the reduced 
availability of live cattle.  Imports of cattle and beef from Canada account for about five percent 
of supply in the United States.  With strong demand, a five percent drop in supply had a big 
impact on prices. Live cattle prices in the United States averaged over C$80/cwt in August, an 
all-time record. Wholesale and retail beef prices also rose.  While there was some downward LeRoy, Weerahewa and Anderson  20 
 
effect on prices when Canadian boxed beef shipments resumed in September 2003, it was 
minimal. 
    
Higher beef prices raised demand for pork.  This increased demand was met largely by an 
increase in pork and hog exports from Canada. Shipments of live hogs almost doubled and the 
rate of hog processing increased to near-record levels.  Exports from Canada increased to more 
than 40,000 head per week, compared to a normal 20,000 to 25,000.  Hog exports from Canada 
also were encouraged by low domestic beef prices.  Although beef price declines at wholesale 
and retail were small, it still had the effect of reducing pork prices. 
 
In 2003, live-hog exports from Canada to the United States in 2003 reached a record 7.3 
million head, up a third from the previous year.  About 2.1 million were mature animals 
slaughter pigs, sows and boars and the rest were weaner and feeder pigs.   Alleging that hog 
imports from Canada were both subsidized and sold below fair market value, on March 5, 2004 
the United States National Pork Producers Council filed separate petitions for countervailing and 
anti-dumping duties were with the U.S. Department of Commerce and the International Trade 
Commission.   
 
A preliminary finding of dumping by the Department of Commerce resulted in the 
application of a 14.06% countervailing duty beginning October 20 on almost all Canadian hog 
shipments. On March 7, 2005 the U.S. Commerce Department issued its final ruling in the hog 
duty case.  The decision confirmed that there is no reason for a countervailing duty because there 
are no significant Canadian government subsidies to pork producers. But it affirmed the anti-
dumping duty on grounds that Canadian hogs were exported to the U.S. at less than the cost of 
production.  The rate of countervailing duty was reduced because of new information, but only to 
an average of 10.63% from 14.06% originally imposed in October. 
 
The matter was settled on April 6, 2005 when the United States International Trade 
Commission ruled that Canadian live slaughter, weaner and feeder pig exports to the U.S. do not 
cause or threaten injury to American producers.  Duties of roughly 14% imposed in October then 
reduced in March would be terminated on April 18 and the duties collected would be returned. LeRoy, Weerahewa and Anderson  21 
 
 
SOME QUANTITATIVE IMPACTS 
 
  It is clear from the above discussion the border closure to live cattle has created 
significant negative impacts on the Canadian cattle industry. The federal and provincial 
governments in Canada have undertaken a number of policies to mitigate the impacts of the trade 
disruptions.  To quantify the impacts of the border closure and the likely impact of mitigation 
mechanisms, a model of the Canadian industry was developed and calibrated for the year 2004 
using demand and supply elasticities reported in the literature.  The following section briefly 
describes the structure of the model and its predictions.  A full description of the model and 
detailed results are provided in the appendix 1.   
 
  The model assumes there are two types of cattle in the market: cattle less than 30 months 
of age (calves, steers and heifers) and cattle more than 30 months of age (cull animals).  It 
considers that the slaughtering capacities for cattle older than 30 months of age are limited in 
Canada.  It accommodates the fact that before the BSE crisis, the United States border was open 
to all types of beef and live cattle produced in Canada and at present the border is open only for 
beef produced from cattle less than 30 months of age.  Consequently, the model predicts that the 
impacts on the cull cattle market due to BSE crisis are higher than those in the other cattle 
market.  
    
  Several policy experiments were performed to quantify the changes on prices and supply 
levels of cattle.  They include the following; (i) opening of border for live cattle and beef markets 
(i.e., no BSE crisis), (ii) an increase in Canadian slaughter capacity by 10 percent (Alberta 
government has already made an investment so as to increase the slaughtering capacity by 10%), 
(iii) a 20 percent herd reduction (as proposed by some policy makers), and (iv) a five percent 
reduction in slaughter efficiency along with a five percent increase in feed prices to account for 
the loss of by-products used as feed ingredients (assuming that the feed regulation would lead to 
a decrease in slaughtering efficiency and an increase in feed prices by five percent).   
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  The results indicate that if the border were open, the prices would have been 20 percent 
higher, and hence cattle supply levels would have been around 12 percent higher. By increasing 
slaughter capacities by 10%, cattle prices can only be increased up to 15% and 7% of animals 
below and above 30 months of age respectively.  By destroying 20% of the cattle herd, prices 
can be increased only up to 11% and 6% of animals below and above 30 months of age 
respectively, however, it will be associated with a drop in cattle supply levels.  When the feed 
regulation is introduced, cattle prices will decline due to reductions in slaughtering efficiency 
(which offset the increase in feed price), and it will be associated with a drop in cattle supply.   
 
The above results, which are more suggestive than conclusive, indicate that an increase in 
slaughter capacity, which is happening at this time, would have a greater impact on cattle prices 
than would a herd reduction program.  Further simulations need to be conducted with different 
elasticities, policy packages and policy levels to confirm the results.  
 
LESSONS LEARNED AND A LOOK FORWARD 
  
  This paper described the history of BSE in North America and its effects on producers of 
cattle and hogs and on taxpayers.  While cattlemen in the United States and Mexico have 
enjoyed higher prices than would otherwise have been the case, Canadian cattle producers have 
faced extreme financial hardships as a result of the loss of export markets in spite of abundant 
and costly relief programs.   
 
  Industry stakeholders in North America had several years to learn from the disastrous 
experiences with BSE in the United Kingdom and other European countries.  However, few 
changes were made to production systems in North America that might have forestalled or even 
prevented some of the financial chaos that has occurred. 
 
  The discovery of BSE in North America demonstrates the need for better methods to deal 
with border closures.  Although the Office International des Epizooties has a protocol to close 
borders immediately on discovery of BSE or other serious diseases, there is no similar science-
based mechanism in the NAFTA or the WTO to re-open the borders when there is no significant LeRoy, Weerahewa and Anderson  23 
 
chance of further incidence of the disease.  This shortcoming has been devastating for suppliers 
of a perishable product that are highly dependent on export markets.  Cattlemen in the NAFTA 
region have learned a painful lesson about existing institutions and trade rules and the need to be 
ever cognizant and prepared for the seeming capriciousness of their intended foreign customers 
and their central governments. 
 
It would be a serious setback to growth and productivity in the NAFTA region if the 
freedom of individuals to exchange live animals and beef products continues to be restricted by 
government.  Consumers in both countries have come to rely on safe and nutritious beef made 
available at reasonable cost.  The best way to ensure long-term competitiveness is through 
minimal government interference in market processes throughout North America.   Attempts to 
manipulate the outcomes of market processes have lead to the current difficult situation that 
central authorities could neither specifically predict nor effectively prevent.  The response of 
governments in Canada to try and make the initial NAFTA scheme work has taken the form of 
ever wider, more numerous and more obtrusive interventions which are in further conflict with 
the workings of market mechanisms.   The overall outcome of government intervention in the 
live cattle market in North America is a situation that is even more unsatisfactory (at least for 
cattlemen in Canada) than the preceding state it was designed to remedy.  Unfortunately, there is 
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APPENDIX 1: MODEL 
 
Introduction  
   
  Canadian cattle market is characterized by two types of cattle, young (less than 30 
months old cattle such as calves, steers and heifers, i.e., fed cattle) and old (more than 30 months 
old cattle such as cull bulls and cows that were used in breeding stocks and cull dairy cows).  
Before the BSE crisis both young and old cattle raised in Canada were slaughtered in both US 
and Canadian processing plants and there were significant exports of live animals from Canada 
to the US.  After the BSE crisis, the US border was closed for live cattle, both young and old.  
The border is expected to be open soon for the young cattle.  After the BSE crisis, initially, US 
border was closed for both young and old beef, and later it was open for young beef.  The 
marketing channels of cattle and beef in Canada are presented in Figure A1. 
  
Conceptual framework   
 
  The Canadian cattle and beef market structure can be depicted in a multi-market partial 
equilibrium model with four markets; two vertically related (cattle and beef) and two 
horizontally related (young and old) assuming Canada as a small exporting economy facing 
world market prices of cattle and beef.  This assumption implies that changes in quantities 
produced and consumed in the Canadian market are rather small compared to quantities 
produced and consumed in the rest of the world (including the U.S. and Mexico) and hence it 
implicitly considers that the changes in the Canadian market do not influence the equilibrium in 
the beef and cattle markets in the neighboring countries.   
 
  Figure A2 depicts the equilibrium in the four markets before and after the BSE crisis.  
Equilibrium in the cattle markets (young cattle and old cattle) and beef markets (young beef and 
old beef) under free trade, i.e., before the BSE crisis, were determined by the world market 
prices of cattle and beef respectively.  Panel A shows the old market and panel B shows the 
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ob respectively before the BSE crisis.   The demand for cattle is kinked due to limited 
slaughtering capacity and the supply of cattle is kinked due to biological constraints (limited 
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Figure A2: Equilibrium in cattle and beef markets before and after BSE crisis
10 
                                                 
10 Notations: 
Supply and demand curves: 
Soc = Supply curve of old cattle; Doc = Demand curve for old cattle; Syc = Supply curve of young cattle; Dyc = 
Demand curve for young cattle; Sob = Supply curve of old beef; Dob = Demand curve for old beef; Syb = Supply 
curve of young beef; Dyb = Demand curve for young beef.  
 
Prices and quantities under free trade 
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  Soon after BSE was identified the border was closed for all types of cattle and beef.  As a 
result, prices were internally determined and the interactions between the demand and supply 
curves determined the levels of supply and demand and hence the prices.  Note that, demand 
curves for both old cattle and young cattle are kinked due to limited slaughtering capacities in the 
country.   It is assumed that slaughtering capacity in the old cattle market is binding; where as 
the slaughtering capacity is just above the market clearing quantity in the young cattle market.  
Consequently, the biggest change due to BSE crisis is observed in the old cattle and old beef 
markets.  The interaction between demand for old cattle, which is kinked at D
a
oc and the supply 
of old cattle, Soc, determines the price of old cattle and it is P
a
oc.  When D
a
oc is processed in the 
market, S
a
ob amount of beef can be produced.  The price of old beef is determined when quantity 
supplied is equal to quantity demanded after the BSE crisis and it is P
a
ob.   
  
  In the young cattle market, it was assumed that the slaughtering capacity is not binding.  
Hence, after the BSE crisis, price of young cattle is determined at P
a
yc (note that it is higher than 
P
a
oc) and the market will clear at D
a
yc.  The resulting beef quantity will be S
a
yb, and the beef price 
will be determined at P
a
yb.  The prices of young beef and old beef after the BSE crisis may or 




  Later, the ban on exports of young beef was removed.  As a result, price of young beef 
increased up to the world market price with a decrease in quantity local demand and free trade 
equilibrium was realized in the young beef market.  It is expected that the ban on exports of 
young cattle will be removed in the near future.  As a result, free trade equilibrium would be 
realized in the young cattle market as well. 
  
  As indicated earlier, as a policy response to the crisis, the Canadian government has 
subsidized the investment in increasing slaughtering capacities.  The impacts of such a policy 
can also be discussed using Figure 2.  Suppose that slaughtering capacity in the old cattle market 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
11 Note that in the graphical representation prices in the old market and young market were considered to be the 
same before the BSE crisis.  It does not imply that the nominal prices are the same; rather it implies that price 
indices were the same (before the BSE crisis the prices of old cattle and young cattle moved together).  This 
representation allows seeing the impacts after the BSE crisis more clearly. LeRoy, Weerahewa and Anderson  31 
 
is increased to D
c
oc.  This can increase the price of old cattle to P
c
oc, increase the supply of beef 
to S
c
ob and lower the price of old beef to P
c
ob.  This type of policy has the capacity to mitigate the 
losses incurred by old cattle producers.  The net benefit of this policy could be assessed by 
comparing the size of the investment and expected returns over a specified period of time.   
 
  What will be the outcome of destroying a part of beef cow herd?  Let’s consider that a 
stock of young cattle was destroyed.  Such an action will shift the supply curve of young cattle to 
the left and the interaction between new supply curve and original demand curve will determine 
the price (not shown in figure 2).  As a result, price of young cattle will be increased and quantity 
of young cattle slaughtered will be decreased.  If the market for young beef is closed these 
changes in the cattle market will lead to a decrease in supply of beef and to increase price of 
beef.  If the market is open, the world market price will determine the quantity demanded and the 
difference between supply and demand will be exported.  What if a stock of old cattle is 
destroyed?  It too will shift the supply curve the left, however the impacts depend upon the point 
of intersection between supply and demand.  If the new supply curve intersects with the perfectly 
inelastic portion of the demand curve, there will be no change in the equilibrium quantity, 
however, the price of old cattle will rise.   If the new supply curve intersects with the downward 
slopping portion of the demand curve, there will be a reduction in the equilibrium quantity with a 
rise in price of cattle.  It will result in a lower beef supply and hence a higher price for beef. 
  
  Feed regulation to remove risk material from the carcasses will have an effect on the 
demand for cattle
12.  Though very small, such a regulation could reduce the efficiency in 
slaughtering and it will shift the demand curves of cattle to the left.  It will lead to further 
reductions in cattle prices, decrease in quantities demanded and supplied in the cattle market and 
decreases in beef quantities supplied.  If the beef market is open, then world market prices 
determine the quantity demanded.  If the beef market is closed, reduction in beef supply will lead 
to increase in beef prices.   Furthermore, feed regulation may increase prices of feed as SRM is 
not allowed to be included in feed.  An increase in price of feed could shift the supply curve of 
cattle to the left and it will increase the price of cattle. 
                                                 
12 Feed regulation involves (i) removal and separation of specified risk materials (SRM) in beef slaughter plants, (ii) 
separation, dedicated transportation and provision of rendering facilities for SRMs and for the other inedible beef 
byproducts, and (iii) distinction of rendered SRMs.  LeRoy, Weerahewa and Anderson  32 
 
  The welfare implications of BSE crisis and implications of above proposed policies can 
be discussed under a number of headings, i.e., the impacts on producers, processors and 
consumers on the young and old markets in Canada
13.  The sum of cattle producers’ surplus, 
cattle processors surplus and beef consumers surplus will determine the total social surplus.  In 
both young and old markets, BSE crisis has depressed cattle and beef prices, decreased cattle 
supply, increased demand for cattle and supply of beef, and increased demand for beef.  As a 
result, cattle producers incurred losses and cattle processors and beef consumers gained.    The 
biggest loss is incurred by the old cattle producers.  The loss in producer surplus of old and 
young cattle producers are shown by the light shaded areas in the top diagrams in Panel A and B 
respectively.  The gain in processor surpluses are given by the dark shaded areas in the top 
diagrams in Panel A and B respectively.  It is clear that loss in producer surplus cannot be 
compensated by the gains in processor surpluses and there are net losses in the cattle markets as 
shown by the remaining areas. 
  
  The gainers of the BSE crisis are the final consumers of beef. The gains in consumer 
surpluses of old beef consumers are shown by the light shaded areas in the bottom diagrams in 
Panel A (there is no change in the consumer surplus in the young cattle market as consumers 
face world market prices before and after BSE crisis).  The drop in prices of beef will reduce the 
demand for beef substitutes and final consumers of pork and chicken will be adversely affected 
due to BSE crisis.    
 
  An increase in slaughtering capacity can reduce the losses incurred by cattle producers.  
Discarding a stock of cattle will be a net loss to the cattle producers at least in the initial period 
despite its positive impact on cattle prices. A feed ban will be an extra burden on cattle 
producers.   
 
                                                 
13 Since Canada is assumed to be a small open economy, these welfare changes do not influence the equilibrium in 
cattle and beef markets in the U.S. or Mexico. LeRoy, Weerahewa and Anderson  33 
 
Algebraic Representation  
 
Supply function of young cattle
14 
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14 A cross price term can be incorporated to this equation to find out the change in young cattle supply due to 
changes in lagged price of old cattle.   This way, biological constraints can be included in the model.  In this paper, 
the model is calibrated to 2004 data set and hence, the price of old cattle in 2001/2002 should be included as the 
appropriate biological lag would be around 30 months.  The BSE crisis began in 2003 and hence lagged price does 
not play an important role when the model is calibrated for 2004 data. 
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The above model was calibrated for the following dataset and elasticity estimates and it was run 
using minos algorithm in GAMS.   
 
Data and parameters  
According to the Annual Report of CanFax (2004), the sex of Canadian cattle and calves 
slaughtered reported by Canadian Beef Grading Agency are as follows.  Steer: 2,011,460; Heifer: 
1,383,732; Cow: 466,726; Bull: 52,671 and Calves: 353,050.  If we consider cows and bulls as 
old cattle, the number of old cattle slaughtered will be 519,397.  If we consider steers, heifers 
and calves as young cattle, the number of young cattle slaughtered will be 3,748,242. 
 
The same source indicates that the warm carcass weights for steers, heifers, cows and bulls are 
869, 766, 604 and 1041 lbs respectively.  For vealers it is considered to be 700 lbs.  Hence the 
weighted average carcass weights of old cattle and young cattle will be 695 and 801 lbs 
respectively.  Using above information, one can approximate the production of old beef and 
young beef in Canada.  It will be 3,610,335 cwt (equivalent to 519,397*695/100) of old beef and 
30,026,199 cwt (equivalent to 3,748,242*801/100).  
 
Even though it is recorded that slaughter plant capacity is 3.9 million head in 2004, the actual 
numbers slaughtered is more than it.  As indicated earlier, 519,397 of old cattle and 3,748,242 of 
young cattle were slaughtered (the differences in figures may be due to differences in the 
capacities in the beginning and end of the year).  
 
It recorded in CanFax that Alberta fed steer price as $ 78.40 per cwt, Alberta calf price as $ 100 
per cwt and Ontario D1,2 cow price as $ 21.75 per cwt in 2004.  This information can be used to 
calculate the average price of old and young animals if the average weight of an animal is 
known.  The average weight can be determined by using the dressing percentage and carcass 
weight. The dressing percentage of cull bulls can be considered as somewhere between 48-58% 
(source unknown). A majority of cull dairy cows are sold as   
cutters or canners (dressing%=40-50%). Cull beef cows range from   
commercial grade to boning or breaking utility (dressing percentage   
50-60%).  This information can be used to calculate the weighted average of old cattle dressing LeRoy, Weerahewa and Anderson  35 
 
rate and it will be 50%.  According to Agriculture, Food and Rural Development of Alberta 
government ('http://www.agric.gov.ab.ca/app21/rtw/sendmail.jsp?docurl='+document.location, 
'MailAFriend', 'toolbar=0,location=0,menubar=0,width=600,height=475,left=50,top=50'), the 
dressing % of medium steers and heifers are 58.5 and 57.0 respectively, which imply that the 
weighted average young cattle dressing rate is 58%.  For vealers (calves) the dressing rate can be 
considered to be 50%.  Hence the average weights (carcass weight/dressing rate) of old and 
young animals will be 13.82 and 14.02 cwt respectively.  As a result prices of old and young 
animals can be expressed as $ 300.54 and 1144.23 respectively.  
 
According to Grier and Martin (2004) live cattle prices would have been 20% higher than the 
current price if there was no BSE crisis.  Canadian AAA cutout value for beef is reported to be $ 
172.60 per cwt.  Steaks and roasts are produced from young steers and heifers.  Older cows are 
used for manufacturing (grinding or ground) beef.  According to 
http://lmic.info/meatscanner/meatscanner.shtml the average price of ground beef in the US was 
2.38$ and the average price of other types of beef was 4.24.  It implies that the price difference 
between old beef and young beef is 1:1.78, and hence the old beef and young beef prices can be 
considered as $ 124.11 and 221.09 respectively. 
 
In 2004, total beef consumption was 66% of local production, which is equivalent to 22,460,118 
cwt.  Since old beef was not allowed to be traded, the entire old beef production was consumed 
in Canada.  The amount of young beef consumed in Canada hence was 18,849,783 cwt.   
According to CanFax weekly, cattle:barley ratio was 22:1 in Calgory. 
 
The above data set was calibrated to obtain the parameters of the model using the elasticity 
estimates reported in table A1. 
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Table A1: Elasticity estimates 
 Estimate  Source  and  year 
Cattle supply w.r.t. own price 
(weighted average of 0.07 and 0.75) 
0.07 
0.75 
FARM: cow calf own price—short term 
FARM: Feed lot own price—short term 
Cattle  demand  w.r.t.  own  price  -0.52  FARM: Fed cattle by packers (short 
term) 
Cattle  demand  w.r.t  beef  price  0.66  FARM: Assuming these are same as 
beef supply w.r.t cattle price. 
Old beef demand w.r.t own price  -0.693  FARM: Low quality beef (BFL) 
Young beef demand w.r.t. own price  -0.477  FARM: High quality beef (BFH) 
Old beef demand w.r.t cross price  0.055  FARM: BFL w r t BFH price 
Young beef demand w.r.t. cross price  0.043  FARM: BFH w r t BFL price 






  The above framework was used to quantify the impacts of BSE crisis and BSE recovery 
programs.  Appendices show the algebraic model, data and parameters used in the analysis.  The 
model was calibrated to 2004 economy, which is characterized by a BSE shock, and the 
following policy experiments were conducted.  
 
(i)  No BSE crisis:  Prices will be the US equivalent prices (a 20% increase in prices is 
expected according to Grier and Martin, 2005). 
a.  Young cattle US equivalent price
15: 1373.08 
b.  Old cattle US equivalent price: 360.65  
c.  Old beef US equivalent price: 148.93  
                                                 
15 If the border were to open for live cattle, live cattle transportation costs to the US could rise as there will be more 
paperwork required and physical restrictions on the transport of live cattle.  It was assumed that the 20% increase in 
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(ii)  Increase in cattle slaughtering capacity by 10%  (Note that Tyson in Brooks, Alberta 
is in the process of expanding its facility from 4500/head/day to about   
5000/hd/day.   The construction of smaller plants, even if there are   
several, will not increase the slaughter capacity in Canada by more than   
10%). 
(iii)  Feed regulation: Decrease in slaughtering efficiency by 5% and an increase in feed 
prices by 5%. 
(iv)  Eliminating 20% of the young and old stocks of   
animals (Under normal conditions, 10% is culled from the   
herd and an elimination by 20% implies a net elimination by 10%). 
Impacts of above policy experiments on quantities demanded and supplied and on prices are 
summarized in Tables A2 and A3. 
 
Table A2: Results of the simulations  













Supply Number  519,397 586,147  571,336  519,397  493,427 
Demand Number  519,397  519,397  571,336  519,397  493,427 
Old 
cattle 
Price $/cattle  301  360  347  334  282 
Supply Number  3,748,242  4,235,323  3,927,140 3,624,307 3,642,946 
Demand Number  3,748,242  3,357,657 3,927,140 3,624,307  3,624,946 
Young 
cattle 
Price $/cattle  1144  1373  1228  1216  1111 
Supply Cwt  3,610,335  3,610,335  3,971,368 3,610,335 3,429,818 
Demand Cwt  3,610,335  3,100,459 3,971,368 3,610,335  3,429,818 
Old 
beef 
Price $/cwt  124  149  106  124  133 
Supply Cwt  3.0020E7  2.689E7 3.1459E7  2.9033E7 2.9183E7 
Demand Cwt  1.8589E7 1.8752E7  1.8474E7  1.8589E7  1.8647E7 
Young 
beef 
Price $/cwt  221  221  221  221  221 
 LeRoy, Weerahewa and Anderson  38 
 
Table A3: Results of the simulations (% change from the base)  






20% of cattle 
stock 
Feed regulation 
Supply 12.852  10.000  0.000  -5.00  Old 
cattle  Price  20.00  15.42 10.84 -6.245 
Supply 12.995  4.773  -3.306  -2.809  Young 
cattle  Price  20.00  7.360 6.359 -2.867 
 
 
The above results indicate that if there were no BSE crisis, old cattle and young cattle 
supply levels would have been higher by 12.852% and 12.995% respectively due to higher prices 
prevailed in the markets.  By increasing slaughter capacities by 10%, old and young prices can 
be increased by 15% and 7% respectively.  By destroying 20% of the cattle stock, old and young 
prices can be increased only up to 11% and 6% respectively; however, it will be associated with 
a drop in cattle supply levels.  When the feed regulation is introduced, cattle prices will decline 
due to reductions in slaughtering efficiency, and it will be associated with a drop in cattle supply. 
 
Suggestions for further analysis 
Further simulations need to be conducted with different elasticities, policy packages and 
policy levels to confirm the findings.  The model needs to be expanded to accommodate the 
dynamic effects of BSE crisis which would carry through the inventories.  For example, when 
the border was closed, the supply levels of old cattle and young cattle were not dropped 





oc were supplied according to the present formulation.  Due to limited slaughtering capacities 
in the country, an excess supply of young and old cattle was created and they were absorbed by 
the inventories.  The young inventories were later converted into old inventories as time passed.  
The model only considers upward slopping supply curves implying that they depict the 
equilibrium in the long run.  Also, the model does not consider the accumulation of young cattle 
stock due to increased use of older animals for breeding rather than slaughtering as a result of 
lower prices for old cattle prevailed in the market.  LeRoy, Weerahewa and Anderson  39 
 
 
Figure 1:  BSE timeline 
January 2003 — An eight-year-old cow was sent for slaughter to a provincially licensed meat facility in 
Alberta. The animal showed signs of illness, and a provincial meat inspector condemned the carcass as 
unsuitable for human consumption. No meat from the animal entered the food chain.  The head of the 
animal was collected and submitted routinely as part of the BSE surveillance program. The remains of the 
cow were sent for rendering. 
 
May 20 — The World Reference Laboratory in Weybridge, U.K, confirmed that the sample is positive 
for BSE. 
 
May 20-June 16 — Herds in Alberta, Saskatchewan and B.C. that could be connected to the infected cow 
are depopulated and tested for BSE. All test results are negative. 
 
June 9 — An international panel of scientists confirms Canada's BSE investigation is thorough and 
effective. 
 
June 12 — Training and short-term relief grants are announced for workers laid off as a direct result of 
BSE. 
 
June 18 — A federal-provincial compensation program for cattle producers is announced, with Alberta 
committing $100 million. 
 
July 4 — The Canadian Food Inspection Agency releases its report on the BSE investigation. 
 
July 25 — Alberta's cattle industry is provided with $79 million in interim support as borders remain 
closed to Canadian cattle and beef. 
 
August 8 — The U.S. government announces they will partially lift a ban on Canadian beef. 
 
August 25 — A market adjustment program to stimulate the province's cattle marketplace begins. 
 
September 10 — Boxed beef imports to the United States from Canada resume. 
 
September 23 — A compensation program is introduced for bison, veal, sheep, goat, elk and deer 
producers also affected by BSE. 
 
October 9 — Two new compensation programs for cattle producers and processors are announced. 
 
October 24 — Two new programs are introduced to help Alberta's meat processing industry develop 
innovative solutions to deal with the surplus of cattle over 30 months of age. 
 
October 31 — The U.S. government releases proposed rules to consider opening the border to live cattle 
less than 30 months of age. If the rules were approved as written, 85 per cent of cattle exports from 
Alberta to the U.S. would have been restored. 
 
December 23 — The U.S. government announces a "presumptive positive" case of BSE from a cow in 
Washington state. The diagnosis is confirmed on December 25. 
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January 6, 2004 — American and Canadian officials announce jointly that DNA evidence shows that in 
all likelihood the infected cow was born in Alberta. The animal was born before the 1997 ban on feeding 
rendered ruminant carcasses — such as sheep, goats, cattle, deer and elk — to other ruminants. 
 
March 8 — The U.S. announces a second comment period on opening the border to live cattle less than 
30 months of age. 
 
April 7 — The comment period closed. 
 
April 19 — The U.S. announces that it has removed all restrictions on the import of beef from cattle less 
than 30 months of age, including ground beef, processed beef products and bone-in beef. 
 
April 23 — The American lobby group R-CALF files an injunction in an attempt to prevent the USDA 
from allowing Canadian bone-in beef, ground beef and processed beef products to enter the United States. 
Boneless beef shipments are unaffected. 
 
May 6 — The USDA reaches an agreement with R-CALF, allowing the injunction to stay in place until 
the USDA publishes final rules regarding the importation of Canadian beef products. 
 
July 27 — The Auditor General of Alberta releases his report on the government's BSE-related assistance 
programs. 
 
September 10 — A second federal-provincial BSE assistance program announced with the Alberta 
government committing $230 million in new BSE funds. 
 
November 30 — Hong Kong lifts its ban on boneless beef from animals under 30 months of age. 
 
December 14 — Cuba opens its borders to beef and beef products of any age, with minor exceptions, 
such as mechanically separated meat, vertebral column, trimmings, and tissues derived from the head. 
 
December 29 — A new federal-provincial program that will provide $8 million in support to Alberta's 
sheep, goat, deer, elk, reindeer and bison producers is announced.  The United States announces that it 
will open its borders to live cattle and bison under 30 months of age as of March 7, 2005. Other ruminants 
such as sheep, goats, deer, elk, llamas and alpacas will also be allowed entry. The U.S. will also allow 
imports of beef from cattle older than 30 months. 
 
December 30 — The Canadian Food Inspection Agency announces preliminary tests have produced a 
positive result from a 10-year-old Alberta dairy cow.  
 
January 2, 2005 — The positive result is confirmed. The proposed border opening is unaffected as the 
U.S. continues to consider Canada as a minimal-risk region. 
 
January 11 — The Canadian Food Inspection Agency announces it has detected BSE in a six-year-old 
Alberta beef cow.  
 
February 28 — The Alberta Prion Science Initiative is announced. The $38 million research program 
will investigate the genetics, diagnosis and treatment of diseases related to prions and other proteins. 
Prions are best known for their link to BSE. 
 
March 2 — A Federal District Court judge in Montana grants a temporary injunction preventing the 
proposed March 7 rule from coming into effect. LeRoy, Weerahewa and Anderson  41 
 
 
March 7 — An additional $37 million in funding for BSE recovery initiatives is announced. 
 
March 31 — Cuba reopens its border to live Canadian cattle. Canadian exporters are now able to ship 
live cattle, goats and sheep, meat from these animals, as well as bovine semen and embryos. 
 
April 7 — An additional $2 million in marketing assistance is provided for sheep, goat, deer, elk, 
reindeer and bison producers in Alberta. 
 
Source:  Government of Alberta.  http://www.gov.ab.ca/home/index.cfm?page=751 LeRoy, Weerahewa and Anderson  42 
 
 






























































































C$4,000,000 734  54,744  C$3,906,257  Alberta 
(100%) 
TOTAL   C$554,964,000    972,721  C$402,882,627   
 